More details may be found in this InfoQ news story. Plans to evolve further deprecation of the Security Manager in Java 18, presumably in a successor JEP, include: preventing a Java application or library from dynamically installing a Security Manager unless the end user has explicitly opted to allow it and degrade other Security Manager APIs so that they remain in place, but with limited or no functionality. At the moment this is not exactly clear, and I noticed some teams have been cautious with taking action pending any official statement regarding this matter. A good first step would be perhaps to add a statement of intent that Jakarta EE indeed plans to follow Java SE and in the future remove usage of the security manager. It's therefore probably good to prepare for this already in EE 10. As it stands, these API artefacts would not be consumable on the Java SE version where the security manager is actually removed. This even concerns the API artefacts, as security manager calls take place in these. We don't exactly know when the security manager will actually be removed, but it's an impediment for EE implementations to run on whatever version that is, be it Java SE 18, Java SE 19, etc. It's therefore likely all Jakarta EE 10 implementations will come into contact with this sooner or later. However, implementations for Jakarta EE 9.1 (like GlassFish) already run on JDK 17 today and have to deal with aggressive warnings in the console about the security manager deprecation. These must be either relaxed or removed in order for compliant applications to run on future Java releases after the Security Manager is degraded and then removed.Ĭoncerned over future development of Jakarta EE, Arjan Tijms, self-employed software consultant, author, and committer to 23 EE4J projects, writes:Īs was discussed before, the removal of the Security Manager in Java SE will impact Jakarta EE.Ĭurrently Jakarta EE 10 will target Java SE 11, so will theoretically not be affected by this. Jakarta EE has several requirements on the Security Manager. As described in the risks and assumptions section of JEP 411: The intent is to deprecate the Security Manager, introduced in Java 1.0, for removal in conjunction with JEP 398, Deprecate the Applet API for Removal. JEP 411: Deprecate the Security Manager for Removalįor many years, the Security Manager has not been the primary means of securing client-side Java code and has rarely been used to secure server-side code. OpenJDK 64-Bit Server VM warning: Ignoring option -illegal-access=permit For example, attempting use this option by assigning the value permit will yield the following warning: As the successor to JEP 396, Strongly Encapsulate JDK Internals by Default, it will no longer be possible to bypass strong encapsulation via the command-line option, -illegal-access, in Java 17. JEP 403: Strongly Encapsulate JDK InternalsĪs one of the primary goals of Project Jigsaw, JEP 403 proposes to strongly encapsulate all internal elements of the JDK, except for critical internal APIs, such as, to improve the security and maintainability of the JDK. Two of the JEPs within the Java 17 feature set, JEP 403 and JEP 411, generated some concern within the Java community. The feature cadence for Java 17 remains similar to previous releases with 17 features in Java 16, 14 features in Java 15 and 16 features in Java 14.
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